

Chad: Origins and Impact of Factional Strife (U)

A Research Paper

Secret

ALA 81-10046 December 1981

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
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Information available as of 28 December 1981 has been used in the preparation of this report.

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This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of	
Operations, the Offices of Near East-South Asia	
Analysis and Central Reference, and the National	
Intelligence Officer for Africa	

Secret
ALA 81-10046
December 1981



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Approved For Release 2007/08/04 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200400079-5

Overview

Chad: Origins and Impact of Factional Strife	25 X 1
Chad's factional strife has made the country an exploitable target for Libyan adventurism that threatens neighboring states and Western interests in the region. Although Libyan troops left Chad in late 1981, longstanding ethnic, regional, and social tensions continue to fuel bitter factional rivalries and political instability. Prospects for preventing new turmoil and for limiting opportunities for foreign meddling seem poor.	
More than two years after coming to power, President Goukouni's feeble coalition government has had little success in containing the quarrels among competing groups and is showing new signs of unraveling as a result of personal rivalries. Chad is less a nation than a convenient geographic expression for an arena where hostile armed bands wage an age-old power struggle with few if any ideological pretentions.	
Chad in modern times has known relative stability only during periods of foreign military occupation—first by France and for the past year by the Libyans, who entered in force in October 1980 to reverse the Goukouni regime's waning military fortunes against rebel Defense Minister Habre. Peacekeeping forces that have been sent to Chad by the Organization of African Unity are an uncertain substitute for the Libyan troops who maintained relative calm. In any event, no occupying power has been able to do more than postpone a new upheaval.	-
Another round of major fighting in Chad's 16-year-old civil war could soo erupt and might ultimately lead to a formal partition between the Muslim north and the Christian and animist south. The south is more cohesive ethnically and on a firmer footing economically than the north and probably could make a go of it alone. The north, however, would remain torn by factional feuding and probably would be subject to heavy Libyan influence.	

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Chad: Origins and Impact of Factional Strife

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Again on the Brink

As 1982 begins, Chad's factional struggle is intensifying. President Goukouni's beleaguered coalition government faces an increasingly serious threat in central Chad from insurgent leader Habre, whose forces in recent weeks have moved west from their eastern stronghold in a series of successes that could cause the regime to split apart and full-fledged civil war to resume. OAU troops could soon face their first test as a neutral buffer intended to separate Chad's feuding factions. The peacekeeping force is reluctant to fight the insurgents, however, and it might stand aside if there is a major confrontation.

Habre probably still hopes to trade on his growing strength to regain a government role, but the relative ease of his recent victories could embolden him to try again to seize power. Meanwhile, President Goukouni faces mounting criticism from other government factional leaders for his decision last November to dispense with Libyan troops. He seems increasingly desperate and might ask Libya to return if his position deteriorates much more. The Libyans pulled out of Chad partly to show Goukouni that he could not survive his country's chronic factional strife without them, and Tripoli probably would come to his aid again if his government were to make a formal request.

Civil War: A Way of Life

Political factionalism is the single biggest obstacle to stability and centralized rule in Chad. At least 16 prominent leaders—some with sizable armed followings—command varying degrees of support among the country's 4.5 million people and 200 distinct ethnic groups. Disputes are frequent and are seldom settled peacefully. Some groups try from time to time to reconcile their differences and work together—such as the current effort by the larger factions to form an integrated national army to keep order—but resentments are so deep that agreements invariably collapse.

Chad's factions are largely the result of geography and sociology, and they illustrate the problems caused by territorial boundaries arbitrarily established during the French colonial era. The country stretches from the heart of the Sahara Desert in the Arabinfluenced north to the savannas of equatorial black Africa in the south and is at the crossroads of powerful competing cultural and religious influences. Chad—like many African countries—is less a political entity than an awkward patchwork of countless small and unintegrated ethnic groups, many with sharply different traditions, lifestyles, and beliefs.

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Four broad groups of peoples predominate in Chad. The largest grouping—the black Sara—is a culturally cohesive people who reside in the south below the 10th parallel and account for a quarter of Chad's population. North of the Sara belt, in an arc stretching from Nigeria to Sudan, live a number of fragmented Arab clans which together total 14 percent of the population and form the second-largest group. Cohabiting the central and eastern regions are a jumbled assortment of Islamized non-Arab peoples—especially the Maba, a collection of strong-willed and xenophobic mountain tribes which have long made eastern Chad a hotbed of resistance to central rule. Finally, in the sparsely populated desert and mountain wastelands above the 14th parallel live the fiercely independent 25X1 Toubou, a loose network of mutually feuding, seminomadic, non-Arab warrior clans that make up less than 4 percent of the population but have been in the forefront of the country's civil war since 1968.

Chad's history since the 14th century has been 25X1 marked by a bitter struggle for dominance between its northern and southern groups. The Maba and other Muslim peoples held sway during the precolonial period and terrorized the Sara-dominated south with frequent slave raids. After France began to colonize Chad in the late 19th century, the Sara quickly adapted to French culture and exploited opportunities for education and advancement, while the northerners spent their energies in armed resistance to the French.

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Although the north was never fully subdued, France by the 1950s had brought the region under some semblance of control, setting the stage for the south's	In 1975, young southern officers seized power, installed General Malloum—a weak and uninspiring Sara leader—as President, and tried unsuccessfully to	
rise to political dominance shortly before Chad gained	make peace with the insurgents. In March 1979—	
independence in 1960.	after a desperate attempt by the Malloum regime to	25X1
	divide the rebels by bringing some of them into the	20/(1
French colonial rule did not, however, result in nation-	government—N'Djamena fell to Toubou forces loyal	
al integration or foster a sense of national identity.	to guerrilla leader Goukouni, bringing full circle the	
Although the French fought hard to conquer Chad,	age-old struggle between north and south.	25 X 1
once it was theirs they largely neglected it. Chad		•
consequently stagnated during some 60 years as a	After months of political infighting among the victori-	
French colony, with its internal cleavages essentially	ous Muslim factions, Goukouni became head of the	
"frozen" while French troops maintained the peace.	Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT),	
The economy—outside the south, which became a	a provisional regime that grew out of OAU efforts to	
center of cotton cultivation for export—remained	reconcile the ever-growing number of northern splin-	
undeveloped, and traditional ethnic and regional ani-	ter groups with others that had begun to emerge in	
mosities continued to fester even as new ones	the south. Quarrels quickly paralyzed the coalition,	
emerged.	however, and led to new fighting in March 1980 when	25 X 1
N/I - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -	Defense Minister Habre—a brilliant but ruthless	
When the postcolonial Sara-government of Francois	Toubou factional leader and at one time Goukouni's	
Tombalbaye took power in 1960 and cracked down	right-hand man—tried to defeat the other leaders	0574
harshly on Muslim leaders accused of subversive	militarily and take control.	25X1
activities, the illusion of national unity was shattered. Resentment and discord culminated five years later in	Goukouni and other government forces suffered sub-	
a spontaneous peasant uprising in the east that	stantial casualties, and after Habre—outnumbered 4	
marked the beginning of major conflict. By 1968, the	to 1—began to gain the upper hand, the Chadian	
Muslim rebellion had spread west and then north. The	President was forced to ask Libya for direct help.	
Toubous—loosely allied with several other Muslim	Libyan troops intervened in force in October 1980,	
groups in a guerrilla movement called the Front for	and two months later finally pushed Habre's rebels	
the National Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT)—	out of N'Djamena and key population centers in the	
nearly toppled Tombalbaye before French troops,	northern half of Chad. The Libyans kept order until	
which withdrew from Chad in 1964, returned in 1969	Goukouni asked them to leave, and Tripoli—motivat-	
to push them back to isolated desert outposts.	ed in part by international pressure—ordered its	25 X 1
	forces to withdraw in late 1981.	25 X 1
For a time it seemed the south would finally impose		
its will on the north, but the FROLINAT factions	The Major Contenders	
regrouped and again set their sights on the capital,	As Chad teeters once more on the brink of civil war,	
N'Djamena. After French domestic pressure forced Paris to withdraw most of its forces from Chad in	four major factional leaders—three of them high-	
1970, fighting resumed and gradually helped fan	ranking government officials—seem to hold the key to	
discontent among southern military officers. Mean-	the country's future: President Goukouni, Vice President Kamougue, Foreign Minister Acyl, and rebel	_
while, Libya began to provide arms and funds to	leader Habre.	25X1
northern insurgent groups and in 1973 took advantage	ioador Haure.	20/1
of Chad's political paralysis to occupy the Aozou	Goukouni. Chad's figurehead President controls the	•
strip, a narrow band of purportedly mineral-rich	People's Armed Forces (FAP), a once powerful faction	
territory along the Chad-Libya border.	drawn from the Teda, who form the larger of the two	25X1
-	branches of the Toubou people. Goukouni's armed	
	following has weakened considerably in the last two	

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years—FAP now has only about 500 troops—and he

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probably could not stay in power without the continued political and military support of Vice President Kamougue.

Goukouni has long had a record of close Libyan ties, but since last summer he has moved toward the West—especially France. Paris began to send him military aid in November 1981 following his call for Libyan troops to withdraw from Chad by the end of the year. The Chadian President considers himself a nationalist and has often urged other factional leaders to set aside their differences and help rebuild the warravaged country. In reality, however, he still refuses, like the other principal government factional leaders, to come to terms with rebel leader Habre.

Kamougue. Colonel Kamougue—the brains and brawn behind the palace coup that toppled President Tombalbaye in 1975—heads the Armed Forces of Chad (FAT), which he formed when fellow Sara members of Malloum's shattered National Army regrouped to protect the south after N'Diamena fell to FROLINAT insurgents in 1979. FAT is Chad's second-largest faction with some 3,500 men under arms, but they are poorly trained and equipped and are not inclined to fight outside the south.

As Vice President, Kamougue maintains an uneasy alliance with GUNT's northern Muslim factions and faces some political opposition in the south. He has long opposed Libyan influence in Chad, but was unwilling to set aside his hatred for Habre and join the rebel leader in an anti-Libyan insurgency before Tripoli withdrew its troops.

Kamougue appears to be backing Goukouni for now against Foreign Minister Acyl's behind-the-scenes efforts to undercut the President's influence, but the southern factional leader is reluctant to get involved in the north's fratricidal feuding. He might decide to sit on his hands if Acyl tries to seize power in N'Djamena or if Habre's insurgency makes dramatic gains and threatens to topple Goukouni.



Figure 1. President Goukouni (1) and Vice President Kamougue (r): How long will their alliance

Acyl. Chad's pro-Libyan Foreign Minister is an ethnic Arab who draws his support from the various Arab clans in the central regions. He controls the Demo-25X1 cratic Revolutionary Council (CDR), Chad's secondlargest armed faction—about 2,500 troops—and the biggest northern Muslim group. Acyl probably could not have assembled so large a fighting force without Libyan help to recruit and train followers.

Acyl has limited leadership skills and only nominal control of Chad's foreign policy, but he hopes eventually to become president with Libya's help and may be planning a power grab. During the last year his men in eastern Chad took the brunt of the fighting against 25X1 Habre—whom he hates bitterly and sees as his only obstacle to dominating the north—and CDR troops presently comprise most of the government force trying to stem new rebel forays toward the central regions. The latest fighting thus continues to lock Chad's two most ambitious and powerful northern factional leaders in an increasingly tense struggle that 25X1 ironically buys Goukouni some time and allows Kamougue to postpone the decision he inevitably must make about his role in the growing crisis.

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


Figure 2. Foreign Minister Acyl: Planning a power grab?

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Habre. Chad's tenacious guerrilla leader heads the Northern Armed Forces (FAN), which he formed in 1977 after breaking with Goukouni, his Toubou brother and former mentor. Habre draws his support largely from the Daza branch of the Toubous—especially the Anakaza clan, a small but fierce group of nomadic warriors. His forces have consistently been better organized and disciplined than those of other factions, and in the closing weeks of 1981 they have made a strong showing in eastern Chad, where they continue to advance westward against government troops.

Habre has many bitter enemies and will not be able to unite Chad politically. In recent years he has displayed pro-Western sympathies, but the decision last November by Egypt and Sudan—his last remaining foreign benefactors—to cut off military aid will probably force him to look elsewhere for support. He might even turn back to Libya. Tripoli gave Habre and other northern guerrilla leaders some aid in the 1970s during their struggle against the south and might see some advantage to having him keep Chad in turmoil and thus vulnerable to new Libyan meddling.




Figure 3. Rebel leader Habre: Brilliant but ruthless

Bleak Prospects for Stability

After a year of relative calm, Chad again threatens to become the scene of a violent, free-for-all power struggle. Habre is on the move, Goukouni is struggling to survive, Acyl is working against both, and Kamougue is carefully weighing his next decision. Meanwhile, numerous lesser leaders (see chart) are jockeying for position and looking for ways to weather the coming storm.

OAU peacekeeping forces in Chad have slowly started to take up positions outside N'Djamena, but they are reluctant to engage Habre's rebels or to get involved in quarrels between government factions. The OAU units thus are likely to prove ineffective if major fighting continues to spread westward. Similarly, there seems to be little that France or other Western nations can do through diplomatic pressure or economic enticements to halt Chad's latest drift toward renewed widespread fighting.

A return to full-fledged civil war could set the stage for formal partition. The south is politically and ethnically more cohesive than the north and its agricultural-based economy could enable it to survive without the rest of the country. The north, however, would remain inherently unstable and the deep resentments among the various Muslim groups would make 25**X**1

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it an attractive target for new	v meddling by Libyan	
leader Qadhafi, who clearly s	still has designs on the	
area.		25X1
What hope there is of contain	_	
and preventing another upher		
the Chadian Government has	ndles Habre. Goukouni,	
Kamougue, and Acyl—despir	•	
ingness to negotiate with the	rebel leader-know that	
if they cannot stop him milita	rily, they will have to try	
to accommodate him politica	lly. Bringing Habre back	
into the government, however	r, could be as dangerous	
as keeping him out. He proba	ably would not sit still in	
a subordinate position for lon	g if he concluded once	
again that his prospects for s	eizing control of the	
government were good.		25X1
If the Goukouni regime were	somehow to defuse the	
threat of renewed civil war b	y making peace with	
Habre, its next order of busin	ness would be to try to	
integrate all the various facti	onal forces into a truly	
impartial national army. Foll	owing that, the Chadian	
factions would have to focus	on devising a more	
effective form of central gove	ernment. One option	
might be a federal structure,	featuring regional ad-	
ministrators with considerabl	e authority over local	
affairs, which could help mol	lify separatist sentiments	
and preserve some semblance	e of national unity. Pros-	
pects for such developments s	seem remote, however,	
and factional violence is likel	y to remain Chad's	
preferred method of political	discourse for some time	
to come.		25 X 1

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Marketon Section Sec	Political Factions in Chad																	
Mary No.		Transitional Government of Nati	onal Unity (GUNT) *															Enthales for this chart
Ministry		Front for the National Liberation	of Chid (FROLINAT)*															* GUNT grew out of Nincrian-led efforts be the O
Mary	Prgamitotion	FROLINAT-Original	People's Arreed Forces (FAP)	First Army	Volcan Forces	Democratic Revolutionary	People's Movement for the Lib-	Armed Forces of the West			Louissine's Manager	Name (State of						African Unity (OAU) to reconcile Chaf's warring establish a confision processing in N'Damon fo
See			yes	yes	YD			(7.40)		(UND)		Opport racion	(FAN)		Western Chedian Freet (Medela's Mavement)	The Imam of N'Djamera	FROLINAT-Fundamental	
State Stat	eader	Abba Siddick (former GUNT Education Minister)				Acel Aheast (GUNT Foreign Minister)	Rosest Alkhali deemer GUNT			Fachs Balance XII INT Trans.	Naimhoyr Lossimian (GUNT Paral Department Marines	Gen. Negas Djeje	Hincin Habre (former GUNT	no Cel. Deengoes Kimto	ne Mossu Models (farmer GUNT	no Imam Meus Brahim	Hadistree Senousi Germer	formed in Nevember 1979, three measts after seg- size worthers and two southern factions rest in La
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Mary		south-central flarms and Had- erny, west-central Kasembou, and central Arab Muslims.		probably some central Arab Mudinus.			Muslims.			and animists, especially the edu-		corps of FAT; possibly some scattered support among south- orn Sara Christian and animist	box Madins, especially Arms-	and animists, especially the edu- cated/professional clits; move-		among Maskin ormans streng-	em Maba Muslims and related groups in Sudan's Durfur	
Mary			1000 500	500 as pag	300 or lass	shoet 2,500	little or some	200 or less	about 3,500	tone	nesc	Unknown, Dispowers command- or of government forces under former President Malloum and may retain a small council.	Habra in corners Charl; others scattered throughout Charl and	little or some	little or some	nese	little or need	interpret groups append to southern demination original groups still exist. Tractional quartels have the allies net, and it romains little most than a fac- political unity. PROLINAT nonetheless has faci- ed to the property of the property of the pro-
March Sept. Sept			France (funds and arms)	Libya (funds and arms)	Litya (funds and acres)	Litys (funds and arms)	Unknown	Probably Libya (funds and arms)	France (funds and arms) and possibly Libes (some funds)	Unknown; possibly France (funds)			France, Egypt, and Sedon have	Unknown; possibly France	Sedan (feeda)	Unknown	Sedan (funda)	with the seeth.
Seed to Train designed to the seed of the control o								1979	1979	1076	2001							administrative offsire in the south and monitors
		embje of FEOLINAT's fag- mented lowinger feres. 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It has title influence but officially still belongs to GUNT, (There is at least one splinter group with the same same; until recently) it was allied with FAN 3 Admun because) head of FAO in April 1911 after its previous leader Modela emberted from provided by international relief agencies and flied to Southern Section 1911.	semantic of Mildourch Nations assumed to Mildourch Nation amounts to receive the Christian and a state of anythic Mildourch and a state of a st	ern instillectable—meetle dec- ten and lavyses—who basedde regetther after Mullhoust's defeat to still for generalities destrains to the control of the control of the hast lattle in fluence policiently. hast lattle in fluence policiently as Chaff's with emperired positiot recomment. 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Trivial bits designs on	when fallers what with 2 mile and 1 mile and	Libyus faction, MPN chies to be the thicking earth alterna- tive to FAT and FAN. At the same time, MPN has been tra- ticed to the faction of	FAQ—Bot to Station law Apoll to form an arti-Libpan resistance momentum after unbegazing terremational relief funds moder to country. He organized following is weak, and he is empopular with obscured Chadrians. Medida moetholoso will continue to he as surpeyides critic of Goukowi and a moeth-piece for Station's anti-Libyes.	The human is a widely cospected and inflateful religious figure. He has no political arthinous, the he could causly raily considerable used to easy todate or came he might endous. The learns in critical of GUNT and quietly witcomes the Libpan military witchinous. He repercedly in a PAN enthalists has is military witcomes the Libpan military witchinous. He represent the properties of PAN enthalists has it military in critical has it military in climate the facilitation lauder's received for exclosed self-in excl	Samon is in rethic Submon- based with the Khemen- hand field with experience in a park in the recent is exput- bated field with experience years. May find the rething the park submon- sible field him to break with Submon- sed field with the parket groups in the experience of parket field and increased in the parket field and field with 1-10 years fielding. 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